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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JACK CHRISTIANSON and 
:MURL CHRISTIANSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
JOANNE DEBRY, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
11685 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third District Court 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
The Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Judge 
.JACKSON B. HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
JAMES P. COWLEY, for 
PUGSLEY, HAYES, 
CAMPBELL AND CO\VLt6 
Suite 400 El Paso Natural J 
Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
JACK CHRISTIANSON and 
.MURL CHRISTIANSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
JOANNE DEBRY, 
Defendant and Respondent 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11685 
This is an action for personal injuries and property 
damage caused by the negligence of the defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court found defendant negligent as 
a matter of law and entered judgment on a jury ver-
dict in the amount of $3,500.00. The Court denied 
plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, which motion was 
based primarily on the same ground raised here on 
appeal, i.e., error in the admission of certain testimony 
by defendant's expert witness, Dr. Allred. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs request that this Honorable Court grant 
them a new trial on the issue of damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the course of the trial the court allowed 
counsel for defendant, over the objection of plaintiffs' 
counsel, to question defendant's expert witness, Dr. 
Allred, as follows : 
Q. (By Mr. Cowley) Considering the na-
ture of the degenerative disk disease you have 
observed in :Mrs. Christianson, I want to ask if 
you have an opinion as to whether or not that 
condition could account for the headaches. 
A. Yes, it could. 
Q. Do you have an opinion? 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I am 
going to object to the question on the basis it 
"could" because "could" is not the proper ques-
tion to ask of the witness if he is asking an opin-
ion because we are not interested in possibilities. 
Q. (By l\fr. Cowley) I'll ask you again 
Doctor if you have an opinion within the degree 
of medical probability that that condition could 
cause the headaches. 
MR. HOWARD: I make the same objec-
tion. 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 
l\1R. HO\VARD: Your Honor, he has used 
the word "could". 
l\1IR. CO\VLEY: I said within the degree 
of medical probability. 
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THE COURT: It is a matter of weight for 
the .Jury. The objection is overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Within the degree of 
medical probability it can cause headaches. 
Q. (By Mr. Cowley) \iVithin the degree 
of medical probability can it cause the soreness 
or stiffness of the neck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. HO\V ARD: May I have a continuing 
objection to that? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. HOWARD: To the manner in which 
this question is framed. I think it is objection-
able. 
THE COURT: You may. (R. 211) 
On two occasions, in chambers, prior to submitting 
the case to the jury, the plaintiff requested a special 
instruction for the jury to disregard the objectionable 
testimony. This request was not recorded in the record, 
but the plaintiff believes the defendant will not dispute 
the request having been made. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING DEFENDANT'S 
EXPERT MEDICAL WITNESS TO TESTIFY AS TO THE 
POSSIBILITY THAT PLAINTIFF MURL CHRISTIAN-
SON'S SYMPTOMS WERE CAUSED BY A PREEXISTING 
CO:\fDITION. 
It is a well-established rule of law that "an ex-
4 
pert's opm1on, if not stated m terms of the certain 
' 
must at least be stated in terms of the probable, and 
not merely of the possible." 31 Am.J ur.2d 548, "Expert 
and Opinion Evidence'', § 44 ( 1967). 
In Moore v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R. Co., 4 Utah 
2d 255, 292 P.2d 849 ( 1956) expert testimony was al-
lowed by the trial court to the effect that "it was pos-
sible that the accident initiated the condition" of nerve 
irritation and consequent disabilty for whch plaintiff 
might recover. 4 Utah 2d 257, 292 P.2d 880. The Su-
preme Court held that "since no affirmative evidence 
was offered on this issue" the speculative testimony of 
the witness, together with his "learned and convincing 
discourse on ruptured discs·' made it likely that the 
jury would consider the disputed point as proven and 
that "therefore, an instruction should have been given 
to cure a possible prejudice." 4 Utah 2d 259, 292 P.2d 
851. 
To the same effect is Chief Consol. Min. Co. v. 
Salisbury, 61 Utah 66,210 P. 929 (1922) in which the 
court held insufficient to support liability testimony of 
an expert witness to the effect that the accident in 
question "might" have accelerated the diseased con-
dition of the plaintiff's heart and hastened his death. 
Cf. Kujawa v. Baltimore Transit Co., 224 .Md. 195, 
167 A.2d 96, 89 A.L.R. 2d 1166 (1961): "The rulings 
of this court ha\·e been consistent in holding that an 
expert witness must base his opinion on probability and 
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not on mere possibility." 89 A.L.R. 2d 1173. 
The questions of defendant's counsel clearly called 
for conclusions by the expert witness as to "possibility" 
rather than "probability" that the plaintiff's injuries 
were caused by a pre-existing condition. Dr. Allred 
testified not that the condition "did" or "probably did" 
cause plaintiff's headaches, but only that it "could" have 
done so. The assertion that cause A "could have" or 
"can" produce effect B is clearly the grammatical 
equivalent of an assertion that B "possibly" follows from 
A. The mere prefacing of a question with the formula, 
"within a degree of medical probability," could, etc, 
does not convert such speculative testimony given in 
response thereto into an assertion that the causal con-
nection is "probable". 
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CONCLUSION 
It follows from the foregoing that allowing the 
objectionable testimony to go to the jury was prejudical 
error and that plaintiffs' motion for new trial should 
be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Jackson B. Howard, for: 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 8401 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, 
to James P. Cowley, Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss, Camp-
bell and Cowley, Suite 400 El Paso Natural Gas Build-
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this ________ day of 
July, 1969. 
